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IS REASONABLE DOUBT SELF-DEFINING?
LAWRENCE T. WHITE*
MICHAEL D. CICCHINI**
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Constitution protects a defendant from criminal conviction unlessthe government can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1  When
instructing juries on this burden of proof, many courts subscribe to one of
two philosophies.  Some courts go to great lengths to explain the concept
of reasonable doubt to the jury.2  At the other end of the spectrum, many
courts believe that reasonable doubt is already self-defining, and therefore
do little, if anything, to further explain the concept.3
But is the concept of reasonable doubt truly self-defining?  Or do juries
require a definition to fully understand and appreciate it?  The existing
research demonstrates that jurors fail to distinguish between this high bur-
den of proof and lower civil burdens of proof.  That is, in controlled stud-
ies, the different standards of proof do not produce different verdict
patterns.4  Further, other studies demonstrate that jurors interpret reason-
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1. See infra Part II.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part III.
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able doubt to require a relatively low quantum of evidence in the govern-
ment’s favor—somewhere between 63% and 68%—in order to convict.5
Earlier studies that tested the impact of different burdens of proof on
jury decision-making were limited by small and unrepresentative samples.6
We, therefore, decided to improve upon these studies with our own empir-
ical test.7  Further, if juror decision-making is not influenced by different
burdens of proof (as previous studies have demonstrated), we sought to
determine if jurors instead use a simple heuristic, or rule of thumb, re-
garding the strength of the government’s evidence that is needed to
convict.8
To test our hypotheses, we recruited 495 jury-eligible adults in 45
states and randomly assigned them to read one of four case summaries.9
These included a battery case with strong evidence of guilt, a battery case
with weak evidence of guilt, a trespassing case with strong evidence of
guilt, and a trespassing case with weak evidence of guilt.10  Participants
were then randomly assigned to one of three groups, each of which re-
ceived a different burden of proof instruction: preponderance of evi-
dence, clear and convincing evidence, or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.11
As in earlier studies, we found that mock jurors’ verdicts were not
influenced by the different burden of proof instructions, and this held
true for all four case summaries.12  But jurors did not vote haphazardly.
Rather, they were highly sensitive to evidence strength when rendering a
verdict.  In fact, the vast majority of jurors followed a simple heuristic that
we call the 60/65 rule: they either said (1) that less than 60% of the evi-
dence favored the state and voted not guilty, or (2) that more than 65% of
the evidence favored the state and voted guilty.13
Based on our findings and those of earlier researchers, there is now
strong empirical support for a conclusion that reasonable doubt is not self-
defining—i.e., jurors fail to distinguish between it and the lower burdens
of proof and instead will convict defendants on a relatively small quantum
of evidence.14  Therefore, instructions should carefully define reasonable
doubt for jurors, and we recommend doing so by using a comparative
framework.15
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part IV.D.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
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Specifically, by comparing and contrasting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt with the two lower burdens of proof, jury instructions can provide
the necessary context for jurors to understand the high burden the gov-
ernment must satisfy before it may convict a defendant of a crime.16  We
also suggest further research to empirically test our recommended ap-
proach to defining reasonable doubt.17
II. REASONABLE DOUBT: TO DEFINE OR NOT TO DEFINE?
Before a jury may convict a defendant of a crime, the Constitution
requires the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.18
Yet, despite this (theoretically) uniform standard across states and federal
circuits, there are nearly as many jury instructions on reasonable doubt as
there are jurisdictions.19
When instructing their juries, courts often subscribe to one of two
divergent philosophies.  A New Hampshire court described one philo-
sophical approach toward reasonable-doubt instructions as follows:
“[T]his court feels strongly that a jury must be given some assistance in
understanding the concept. . . .  [T]he definition of reasonable doubt is
perhaps the most important aspect of the closing instruction to a jury in a
criminal trial.”20  Courts in this camp often employ lengthy instructions on
the burden of proof and presumption of innocence.  For example, Wis-
consin uses a rambling, 284-word jury instruction;21 Massachusetts’ in-
struction tallies 285 words;22 and Alaska’s weighs in at an effusive 329
words.23
At the other extreme, the Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals
believes that the term reasonable doubt “is self-defining, that there is no
16. Id.
17. See infra Part VII.
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause pro-
tects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).  Although this standard was not explicitly adopted until 1970, the Court
implicitly recognized it much earlier. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469,
488 (1895) (“How, then, upon principle, or consistently with humanity, can a ver-
dict of guilty be properly returned, if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to
the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt, namely, the capacity in law of the
accused to commit that crime?”); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881)
(“The evidence upon which a jury is justified in returning a verdict of guilty must
be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion of all reasonable
doubt.”).
19. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (giving courts tremendous lee-
way when instructing jurors on the government’s burden of proof).  For examples
of the various definitions of reasonable doubt, see Miller W. Shealy, Jr., A Reasona-
ble Doubt About “Reasonable Doubt”, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 225 (2013); Hon. Richard E.
Welch III, “Give Me That Old Time Religion”: The Persistence of the Webster Reasonable
Doubt Instruction and the Need to Abandon It, 48 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 31 (2013).
20. State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980).
21. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 140 (2017).
22. MASS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.180 (2015).
23. ALASKA CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1.06 (2012).
3
White and Cicchini: Is Reasonable Doubt Self-Defining?
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
4 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 1
equivalent phrase more easily understood . . . that the better practice is
not to attempt the definition, and that any effort at further elucidation
tends to misleading refinements.”24  Similarly, the First Circuit Federal
Court of Appeals has warned that defining reasonable doubt “is unneces-
sary, could confuse the jury, and provides fertile grounds for objections.”25
This approach tends to create shorter instructions.  Illinois, for example,
tells jurors that “[t]he State has the burden of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt” and offers no elaboration of the
term; its entire instruction on the presumption of innocence and burden
of proof is only 88 words.26
It is true, as some courts have warned, that attempts to elucidate “rea-
sonable doubt” often add nothing of value, which is the functional
equivalent of not defining it at all.  And other attempts have created con-
fusion—or even worse.  For example, after discussing reasonable doubt,
Wisconsin’s pattern instruction admonishes jurors “not to search for
doubt” but instead “to search for the truth.”27  The impact of this curious
closing mandate has twice been empirically tested.  Not only did the lan-
guage create confusion,28 it actually lowered the burden of proof, in-
creased conviction rates,29 and was the functional equivalent of giving no
reasonable doubt instruction whatsoever.30
But is it true that reasonable doubt is self-defining and therefore re-
quires little or no explanation?  That is, do juries intuitively understand
the meaning of the term without a legally correct definition from the trial
judge?  If the self-defining hypothesis is correct, then a short “beyond a
reasonable doubt” (BRD) instruction—one with minimal or no elabora-
24. United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 1974).
25. United States v. Vavlitis, 9 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 46 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing the policy against at-
tempting to define reasonable doubt).
26. ILL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.03 (2017).  This instruction is based
on a long line of Illinois cases holding that “neither the trial court nor counsel
should define reasonable doubt for the jury.”  People v. Downs, 69 N.E.3d 784, 788
(Ill. 2015) (citing People v. Speight, 606 N.E.2d 1174 (Ill. 1992); People v. Cagle,
244 N.E.2d 200 (Ill. 1969); People v. Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. 1958); Peo-
ple v. Moses, 123 N.E. 634 (Ill. 1919)).  Several other states, including Texas, also
leave the term undefined. See Timothy J. Ting, It’s Time to Define “Beyond a Reasona-
ble Doubt”, 106 ILL. BAR J. 24 (2018).
27. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 140 (2017).
28. Mock jurors who received this closing mandate were nearly twice as likely
to indicate that their instruction allowed them to convict the defendant even if
they had a reasonable doubt about guilt. See Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T.
White, Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury Instructions on Verdicts: A Conceptual Replica-
tion, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 22, 32 (2017).
29. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An Empirical
Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1155 (2016) (finding a
statistically significant difference in conviction rates between relevant test groups).
30. Id. at 1157 (jurors who were given a reasonable doubt instruction and
then told “not to search for doubt” but “to search for the truth” convicted at the
same rate as those who received no reasonable doubt instruction whatsoever).
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tion—would give defendants more protection than the lower, civil bur-
dens of proof, i.e., preponderance of the evidence (POE) and clear and
convincing evidence (CCE).  Fortunately, this hypothesis is empirically
testable.31
III. EARLIER WORK ON STANDARDS OF PROOF
We know of three published studies—comprised of five total experi-
ments—that tested the effect of different burdens of proof on jurors’ ver-
dicts.  We discuss the studies here as their methodologies and findings
influenced our own study design and conclusions.
In 1973, two British researchers recruited 833 London residents to
serve as mock jurors.32  Participants heard one of two cases (theft or rape)
and received one of three instructions: POE, CCE (described as “sure and
certain”), or BRD.33  In the theft case, the different standards did not pro-
duce different verdict patterns.34  In the rape case, the standards again did
not operate properly: participants who received a BRD instruction con-
victed the defendant at a higher rate (32%) than those who received a less
stringent CCE instruction (18%).35
In 1985, two American researchers conducted two experiments.36  In
the first, 198 undergraduates read a summary of a civil trial in which the
plaintiff sued an insurance company.37  Participants received one of three
instructions—POE, CCE, or BRD—in one of two versions: a standard legal
31. There is also anecdotal evidence that jurors do not understand the con-
cept of reasonable doubt, as they often ask their trial judges for clarification or
even conduct mid-deliberation internet searches on their smart phones. See Bobby
Greene, Reasonable Doubt: Is It Defined by Whatever Is at the Top of the Google Search
Page?, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933, 942-43, 950-53 (2017).  As Greene discusses,
inquiries from the jury can put the trial judge in a quandary.  For example, one
trial judge was found to have erred by responding, “It is for the jury to collectively
determine what reasonable doubt is.” Id. at 942 (quoting People v. Turman, 954
N.E.2d 845, 850 (Ill. App. 2011)).  Inexplicably, another trial judge in the same
state was found to have responded properly by telling the jury, “It is for you to
determine.” Id. (quoting People v. Thomas, 15 N.E.3d 943, 946 (Ill. App. 2014));
see also People v. Downs, 69 N.E.3d 784, 789 (Ill. 2015) (discussing the trial judge’s
response to jury’s request for a definition).
32. W. R. Cornish & A. P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L.
REV. 208, 210 (1973).
33. Id. at 213-14.  The researchers used a very short BRD instruction, offering
minimal commentary that a reasonable doubt is “not a fanciful doubt . . .” Id. at
213.  They also varied the language of the BRD instructions slightly depending on
case type.  The instructions totaled either 32 or 35 words, excluding the portion of
the instruction on the presumption of innocence. Id.
34. Id. at 216.
35. Id. at 217.
36. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal v. Quantified Definitions of
Standards of Proof, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1985).
37. Id. at 163 (“A total of 252 students participated in Experiment 1, but re-
sults from 54 . . . were omitted from data analyses” leaving a sample of 198
participants).
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definition38 or a quantified definition where POE = 51% certainty of guilt,
CCE = 71% certainty, and BRD = 91% certainty.39  Participants rendered
verdicts without deliberations.40  When the standards were defined in
words, i.e., standard legal definitions, the instructions had no discernible
impact on verdicts.41  The quantified versions, however, produced a le-
gally-proper pattern of verdicts: the proportion of verdicts favoring the
plaintiff decreased as the burden of proof became higher.42
In the second experiment, a replication of the first, 220 undergradu-
ates read a summary of a civil trial and received one of three instruc-
tions—POE, CCE, or BRD—in one of three versions: a legal definition, a
quantified definition, or a combined (legal and quantified) definition.43
The quantified definitions again produced a legally-proper pattern of ver-
dicts, but the legal definitions and combined definitions did not.44
In 1991, an American legal psychologist investigated standards of
proof within the context of legal definitions of insanity by conducting two
experiments.45  In the first experiment, 177 undergraduates watched a
videotaped reenactment of a trial in which the defendant was charged
with killing his daughter and three of her friends.46  Participants were in-
structed to apply one of two insanity standards and received one of three
burden of proof instructions: POE, CCE, or BRD.47  The different insanity
standards did not affect participants’ decisions and, more importantly for
our purposes, the different standards of proof had no impact on
verdicts.48
In the second experiment, a replication of the first, 226 undergradu-
ates watched the videotaped reenactment used in the first study and were
assigned to conditions that varied the insanity standard and the burden of
38. The researchers used a short BRD instruction but offered a brief explana-
tion of the concept.  Specifically, they warned that reasonable doubt is “not a mere
possible doubt,” but rather is one that prevents the jurors from feeling “an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the plaintiff’s case.”  The BRD
instruction totaled 79 words. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 164.
41. Id. (“For the legal definitions, the multivariate effect of standard of proof
was not significant . . . indicating that the legal definitions of the standards of
proof had no effect on the dependent variables.”).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 168.
44. Id.
45. James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Deci-
sion Making, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 509 (1991).
46. Id. at 514.
47. Id. at 515.  The substance of these burden of proof instructions is de-
scribed as being “standard jury instructions a judge would give jurors in a similar
case.” Id.
48. Id. at 516 (“[A]ltering the burden and standard of proof do not seem to
make a difference in mock jurors’ decisions . . . .”).
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proof.49  The results of this second experiment were identical to the re-
sults of the first: different insanity standards and different standards of
proof did not produce different verdict patterns.50
To summarize, five experiments in three published studies found lit-
tle or no evidence that different standards of proof produce different ver-
dict patterns as intended by the courts (and as believed by those judges
who contend that reasonable doubt is self-defining and therefore needs
little or no explanation).  Further, when differences in verdict patterns
were observed, they were too small to be statistically significant or did not
order themselves properly in terms of how much protection they afforded
defendants.51
These studies strongly suggest that, instead of interpreting reasonable
doubt as the highest burden of proof, jurors apply a lay standard that differs
substantially from what many courts expect and the Constitution requires.
Specifically, when judges are asked to quantify the conviction threshold
for reasonable doubt, most set the threshold at 85% or higher.52  In one
study, for example, federal judges throughout the U.S. were surveyed.  Of
the 171 respondents, 126 (74%) set the threshold at “90% or higher.”53
Several studies, however, indicate that jurors are satisfied with a much
lower amount of evidentiary proof in order to convict under the BRD stan-
dard.  For example, in 1996, researchers divided 480 jury-eligible adults
into 80 six-person juries.54  Each jury observed a reenactment of a murder
trial and then received one of five definitions of BRD, all of which were
legally permissible.55  When individual jurors were asked to quantify the
BRD standard, they set a mean (average) criterion that ranged from 54%
to 70%, depending on the BRD definition they received.56  None of the
instructions caused jurors to do what most courts expect or want them to
do: “set the certainty of guilt in the high 80’s.”57
49. Id. at 518.
50. Id. at 519 (“[N]o significant results were obtained for burden . . . or stan-
dard of proof. . . .”).
51. As explained during our discussion of the three studies, quantified defini-
tions of the standards of proof did produce a correct verdict pattern, i.e., BRD
instructions generated fewer convictions than the civil burdens of proof.  However,
courts reject the use of quantified definitions. See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari S.
Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasona-
ble Doubt”, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 769, 779 (2000).
52. Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999) (discussing a poll of
federal judges in New York).
53. Id. (discussing C. M. A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta
of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982)).
54. Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition:
The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Ver-
dicts, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 659 (1996).
55. Id. at 660-61.
56. Id. at 666.
57. Id. at 667.
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Similarly, in 2007, researchers found that a simple definition of
BRD—one merely indicating that proof BRD does not require certainty in
order to convict—led undergraduate test participants to set the cutoff be-
tween a guilty and not-guilty verdict at a 63% chance that the defendant
was guilty.58  In other words, “if someone . . . believed that there was about
a 63% chance that the defendant was the culprit, they were as likely to give
a guilty verdict as a not guilty verdict.”59  And in 2014, researchers found
that laypersons, on average, set the subjective probability of guilt needed
to convict at a mere 68%.60
In sum, the findings of empirical studies using mock jurors are re-
markably consistent.  Different standards of proof—POE, CCE, and
BRD—do not produce different verdict patterns, and mock jurors in crim-
inal cases are satisfied with a level of evidentiary proof that is far lower
than what judges expect and what is legally required by the BRD stan-
dard.61  In other words, the evidence thus far points to the conclusion that
reasonable doubt is not self-defining, but rather must be explained to the
jury.
IV. THE STUDY
In our study,62 we sought to remedy the methodological limitations of
the three earlier studies (five experiments) that examined mock jurors’
verdicts as a function of the burden of proof instruction they received.
Taken as a group, the earlier experiments fared poorly in terms of exter-
nal validity and statistical conclusion validity.63
58. Daniel B. Wright & Melanie Hall, How a “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Af-
fects Decisions of Guilt, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 91, 96 (2007).
59. Id.  The control group, or those participants who received no supplemen-
tal, descriptive language but were only told that the burden of proof was BRD, set
the cutoff at a higher level of 77%. Id.
60. Svein Magnussen et al., The Probability of Guilt in Criminal Cases: Are People
Aware of Being ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 196, 199
(2014).
61. One theoretical framework, the “narrative theory of trial,” offers an expla-
nation for this phenomenon: “[T]he side that wins—even in a criminal case—is
the side that tells the story that best fits with the evidence presented.”  Keith A.
Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1266,
1272 (2018).  More specifically, “[i]f conviction of a crime fits the facts better than
acquittal, it is extremely difficult to overcome the desire to match the facts with the
better of the two models, even if the [state’s] case is not very strong.”  Solan, supra note
52, at 108-09 (emphasis added).  Some trial courts exacerbate this problem by spe-
cifically instructing jurors to compare the state’s theory of guilt with the defen-
dant’s theory of innocence.  Such instructions require the jury to balance two
competing theories, which “suggests that a preponderance of the evidence standard is
relevant, when it is not.”  United States v. Kahn, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added).
62. Our study materials and procedures were approved by the Beloit College
Institutional Review Board.
63. External validity refers to the extent to which a study’s findings can be
generalized or applied to other persons and other settings.  Statistical conclusion
validity refers, in part, to a study’s ability to identify statistical relationships that are
weak but real. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTA-
8
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In all five experiments, participants were unrepresentative of jury-eli-
gible adults in the U.S.  Participants were either undergraduates at univer-
sities or residents of a single city (London) outside the U.S.  Participants
responded to a fact pattern that included a particular amount of evidence
against the defendant, thereby limiting the generalizability of any conclu-
sions.  Finally, four of the five experiments relied upon small samples—
fewer than 75 participants per condition.  As a result, those studies were
underpowered statistically.  In other words, different standards of proof
may, in fact, operate as intended, but earlier studies could not detect
weak-to-moderate effects because of small sample sizes.
In addition to remedying the limitations of earlier studies, we also
sought to investigate, within a single controlled study, the possibility that
jurors ignore legal standards of proof and instead use a legally improper
decision rule when deciding whether to convict.  We formally state here
these two related hypotheses.
A. Hypotheses
First, do the three standards of proof—POE, CCE, and BRD—provide
defendants with different degrees of protection on a sliding scale, with
BRD providing more protection than the two civil standards?  The courts
assume they do,64 but empirical studies suggest they do not.65
Second, do jurors use a lay heuristic—a simple rule of thumb that is
independent of legal standards of proof—about how much evidence of
guilt is needed to convict?  Individuals often rely on heuristics, or mental
shortcuts, which can lead to erroneous judgments.66  If such a rule exists,
several studies suggest the verdict threshold for most jurors is somewhere
between 63% and 68% probability of guilt.67
B. Participants
We recruited 500 adults via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) re-
search platform.68  We paid each person $1.00 to participate in an online
TION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37 (Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany 1979).  For the application of these concepts to research on criminal jury
instructions and the burden of proof, see Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T.
White, Educating Judges and Lawyers in Behavioral Research: A Case Study, 53 GONZAGA
L. REV. 159 (2017-18).
64. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
65. See supra Part III.
66. See Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: Implications For
and From Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 63 (2011) (“[J]urors
sometimes rely on cognitive heuristics when making complicated judgments
. . . .”).
67. See supra Part III.
68. See Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. 1, 1–2 (2012) (MTurk has many advantages,
including “easy access to a large, stable, and diverse subject pool, the low cost of
doing experiments, and faster iteration between developing theory and executing
9
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study of juror decision-making.  We eliminated the responses of 25 partici-
pants: 15 because they completed the study in fewer than three minutes,
10 because they failed to answer key questions.  We replaced these partici-
pants with new participants to maintain our desired sample size.  After the
data collection was concluded, we eliminated 5 additional participants: 4
because they were not U.S. citizens, 1 because he completed the study a
second time.
Our final sample consisted of 495 jury-eligible adults who hailed from
45 states and the District of Columbia.  Two hundred forty-eight partici-
pants (50%) identified as female, 244 (49%) as male, and three (< 1%)
did not identify as female or male.  In terms of ethnicity, 79% identified as
White, 7% as African-American, 6% as Asian-American, 4% as Hispanic or
Latin American, 2% as mixed race, 1% as Native American or American
Indian, and 1% as other.
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 76; the median age was 33 years.
In terms of educational background, 12% of participants had completed
high school, 36% some college, 43% a four-year college degree, and 9% a
post-graduate degree.  Eighty-three participants (17%) had prior jury
experience.
C. Study Design
Our study materials used two different criminal cases—battery and
trespassing—to increase generalizability.  We also constructed strong and
weak versions of each case because different standards of proof may pro-
duce different verdict patterns only when evidence of guilt is moderate or
weak.69
We randomly assigned participants to read a case summary that con-
tained one of four fact patterns: a battery case with strong evidence of guilt
(1,419 words), a battery case with weak evidence of guilt (1,386 words), a
trespassing case with strong evidence of guilt (1,150 words), or a trespass-
ing case with weak evidence of guilt (1,281 words).  In all four cases, par-
ticipants were instructed on the elements of the charged crime.70
In the strong-evidence version of the battery case, three witnesses tes-
tified.  A police officer testified that, on the day of the incident, he ob-
served bruises on the alleged victim’s arm and that she signed a complaint
experiments . . . .”); Michael D. Buhrmester et al., An Evaluation of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, Its Rapid Rise, and Its Effective Use, 13 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL SCI. 149, 149 (2017) (“[T]housands of social scientists from seemingly every
field have conducted research using the platform.”).
69. Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, supra note 54, found that one version of BRD—
an instruction that told juries to convict only if they were “firmly convinced” of the
defendant’s guilt—produced fewer guilty verdicts than other versions, but only
when the case against the defendant was weak.  When evidence of guilt was strong,
juries convicted most of the time, regardless of how BRD was defined.
70. All study materials and a complete data file of participants’ responses are
available at https://osf.io/xm5jr/ — a site hosted by the Open Science
Foundation.
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss1/1
2019] REASONABLE DOUBT SELF-DEFINING? 11
against her husband.  However, the alleged victim testified (contrary to
her earlier complaint) that she and her husband had argued, but her hus-
band did not harm her physically.  An expert witness then testified that it
is common for an abused spouse to recant a truthful accusation of domes-
tic violence in order to protect the abuser from criminal prosecution.  The
defendant (the alleged victim’s husband) did not testify.
In the weak-evidence version of the battery case, the same three wit-
nesses testified.  However, this time the police officer admitted that he
could not remember the size of the bruise (“it could have been very
small”); the alleged victim admitted that, although she did sign a com-
plaint, she may have exaggerated the incident; and the expert witness ad-
mitted that there are reasons why a person might make a false police
report against a spouse.
In the strong-evidence version of the trespassing case, two witnesses
testified.  One of the victims71 testified that a man with a handgun entered
his apartment and demanded money but left abruptly without taking any-
thing.  The victim further testified that the police located a suspect about
five blocks away and that he, the victim, went to the suspect’s location and
identified him as the perpetrator.  A police officer testified that the sus-
pect did not have a handgun and the police were unable to locate a hand-
gun in the neighborhood.  The defendant did not testify.
In the weak-evidence version of the trespassing case, the police officer
testified that, even though it took the police eight minutes to arrive, the
suspect was found standing on a corner a mere one block (rather than five
blocks) away from the victim’s apartment.  And while the victim positively
identified the suspect as the perpetrator (just as he did in the strong-evi-
dence version above), the officer admitted that a second victim—the first
victim’s roommate—was unable to pick the defendant out of a lineup the
following day.
After reading one of the four trial summaries, participants were ran-
domly assigned to read a jury instruction on the burden of proof to be
applied when reaching their verdict.  Some participants (n = 99) received
the following POE instruction:
Preponderance of Evidence: The State has the burden of proving the
defendant’s guilt by a preponderance of evidence.  Preponder-
ance of evidence means that it is more probable than not that the
defendant is guilty.  If you are so persuaded, you should find the
defendant guilty.  However, if you are not so persuaded, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.72
Some participants (n = 100) received the following CCE instruction:
71. We use the word “victim” here because in this fact pattern a crime was
committed, and the case turned on the issue of identification.
72. This instruction is based on SEVENTH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO.
1.27 (2015).
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Clear and Convincing Evidence: The State has the burden of prov-
ing the defendant’s guilt by clear and convincing evidence.  This
is a higher burden of proof than “more probable than not.”
Clear and convincing evidence must persuade you that it is highly
probable that the defendant is guilty.  If you are so persuaded, you
should find the defendant guilty.  However, if you are not so per-
suaded, then you must find the defendant not guilty.73
Some participants (n = 296) received a BRD instruction:74
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The State has the burden of proving
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  If, after care-
fully considering all of the evidence, you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.
However, if you have a reasonable doubt, you must find the de-
fendant not guilty.75
After reading their particular burden of proof instruction, partici-
pants rendered a verdict (guilty or not guilty) and indicated how certain
they were about the correctness of their verdict on a 10-point scale.  They
also indicated what percent of the evidence they believed favored the State
(the prosecution).76
73. This instruction is based on SEVENTH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO.
1.28 (2015).
74. Previous studies used short BRD instructions but often included some de-
scriptive language.  To investigate the possibility that such language—short of a
full definition or substantial explanation—would impact verdicts, we constructed
three different BRD instructions.  The first, reproduced above, leaves BRD com-
pletely undefined.  The second equated being convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt with having “a firm belief in the truth of the charge.”  (This language is
comparable to that tested in an earlier controlled study. See Kagehiro & Stanton,
supra note 36, at 163.)  The third reminded jurors to find the defendant not guilty
if they have a reasonable doubt, “even if you think that the charge is probably
true.”  The three instructions totaled 50, 63, and 60 words respectively.  Our three
BRD instructions did not produce statistically significant differences in verdict pat-
terns and had no impact on participants’ responses to other questions, so we com-
bined all participants who received a BRD instruction into a single group (n =
296).
75. This instruction is based on SEVENTH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO.
1.03 (2012).
76. Not only is this test question consistent with the methodologies employed
in the published research, but assigning a numeric, strength-of-evidence value also
makes intuitive sense.  For example, when seeking clarification of the concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, one jury asked the trial judge, “What is your
definition of reasonable doubt, 80%, 70%, 60%?”.  People v. Downs, 69 N.E.3d
784, 786 (Ill. 2015).  Additionally, our wording of the question was designed to
elicit jurors’ confidence level in the defendant’s guilt based on their evaluation of
the evidence in their particular case summary.  Other researchers have worded the
question differently when testing this hypothesis. See supra Part III.  We worded the
question in terms of how much evidence favored the state to invoke the commonly
used weight-of-evidence or scales-of-justice analogy.  For example, one journalist
used such an analogy in explaining the POE standard as follows: “If . . . 50.1% of
the evidence supports a claim but 49.9% does not, that 50.1% is still enough to tip the
12
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Participants then answered an attention-check question about the
number of people who testified as a witness in the case, a question about
the meaning of the judge’s burden of proof instruction, and a set of ques-
tions about their demographic characteristics.
The results of an earlier, face-to-face pilot study led us to believe par-
ticipants could complete the study thoughtfully in nine to ten minutes,
depending on condition.77  The median time used by MTurk participants
to complete the study was 11.5 minutes.
D. Findings
Mock jurors who received a BRD instruction (n = 296) voted to con-
vict at the rate of 43.6%; those who received a CCE instruction (n = 100)
voted to convict at the nearly identical rate of 43.0%; and those who re-
ceived a POE instruction (n = 99) voted to convict at the somewhat lower
rate of 37.4%.78  Statistically speaking, these rates do not differ from each
other, c2 (2) = 1.20, p = .55.79 In plain language, the different standards of
proof—POE, CCE, and BRD—did not produce different verdict patterns.
We observed the same null effect (of SOP instructions) across 4 crimi-
nal cases with different fact patterns: a Battery case with strong evidence of
guilt, a Battery case with weak evidence of guilt, a Trespassing case with
scale, to prove the claim.”  Alan Abrahamson, Tragedy at Sea Pits What-Ifs Against
Legal Proof: Law: Hopes of a Court Victory Fade for Family of Fisherman Who Died Near
Naval Target Range, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-
08-26/local/me-820_1_circuit-court/2 [https://perma.cc/6DH3-C4AJ] (emphasis
added).
77. We conducted a pilot study with 40 participants to determine the time
needed to complete the study and to confirm that (1) participants could easily
understand the instructions, case summaries, and questions; (2) the battery and
trespassing cases would produce a mix of guilty and not guilty verdicts; and (3) the
strong-evidence versions of the cases would produce more guilty verdicts than the
weak-evidence versions.
78. For each participant, we combined their dichotomous verdict (guilty or
not guilty) with their level of certainty (1-10) about the correctness of their verdict
choice to create a new variable called Scaled Verdict.  Values of Scaled Verdict
ranged from 1 to 20, with 1 being very certain that the defendant was not guilty
and 20 being very certain that the defendant was guilty.  Dichotomous verdicts and
Scaled Verdicts were highly correlated, r = .95, p < .001.  (The statistic r is used to
measure the degree to which two variables are mathematically related to each
other.  Values of r can range from 0 to 1.00. The statistic p indicates the likelihood
that the actual correlation between the two variables is zero.)  Therefore, for pur-
poses of simplicity, we discuss only dichotomous verdicts in the text; information
on Scaled Verdicts is relegated to the footnotes.
79. The chi-square statistic (c2) measures the degree to which observed fre-
quencies differ from expected frequencies.  If burden of proof instructions have
no impact on juror verdicts, then we expect the percentage of guilty votes to be
essentially the same, regardless of the instruction received.  This is, in fact, what
we observed. See ARTHUR ARON & ELAINE N. ARON, STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY
509-11 (Leah Jewell et al. eds., Pearson Education, Inc. 3d ed. 2003).  The p-value
value indicates the probability that the observed differences could have occurred
by chance.  In this case, the p-value of .55 means the small differences between the
burden of proof conditions were probably the result of random error.
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strong evidence of guilt, and a Trespassing case with weak evidence of
guilt.80 This pattern suggests that the inadequacy of SOP instructions may
be pervasive, as the null effect does not appear to be case-dependent.
As expected, the case summaries that presented stronger evidence of
the defendant’s guilt produced a higher proportion of guilty votes.  Specif-
ically, mock jurors who received a strong-evidence case (n = 249), either
battery or trespass, voted to convict at the rate of 55.8%.  Those who re-
ceived a weak-evidence case (n = 246), again either battery or trespass,
voted to convict at the much lower rate of 28.5%.  These results are statisti-
cally significant to a high degree of certainty, c2(1) = 38.00, p < .001.
After choosing a verdict, participants estimated the percent of evi-
dence in the case that they believed favored the State, i.e., the amount of
evidence they believed indicated the defendant was probably guilty.  As
expected, jurors assigned to one of the strong-evidence cases offered
higher estimates (63.0%) than jurors assigned to a weak-evidence case
(46.1%).81  Participants’ estimates of the strength of the State’s case were
strong predictors of their verdicts.82
When participants believed that less than 60% of the evidence fa-
vored the State, 93% of participants (233 of 250) voted not guilty.  When
participants believed that more than 65% of the evidence favored the
State, 86% of participants (178 of 206) voted guilty.  The tipping point—
that is, the point at which the majority of participants, for the first time,
voted guilty instead of not guilty—occurred somewhere between 60% and
65%.  This is illustrated in the following table.83
AMOUNT OF
EVIDENCE THAT VOTES VOTES PERCENT
FAVORS THE FOR FOR NOT TOTAL PERCENT NOT
STATE GUILTY GUILTY VOTES GUILTY GUILTY
LESS THAN 50% 12 202 214 6% 94%
50% - 55% 5 31 36 14% 86%
60% 9 18 27 33% 67%
65% 5 4 9 56% 44%
70% - 75% 43 14 57 75% 25%
MORE THAN 75% 135 14 149 91% 9%
TOTAL 209 283 492
80. In the strong-evidence versions of the battery and trespassing cases, the
different burden of proof instructions did not have a statistically significant impact
on Scaled Verdicts, F(2, 245) = 0.50, p = .61.  Even in the weak-evidence versions of
the battery and trespassing cases, the different instructions did not have a statisti-
cally significant impact on Scaled Verdicts, F(2, 242) = 1.60, p = .20.
81. The difference expressed mathematically is t(490) = 6.61, p < .001.
82. This was true for both dichotomous verdicts (r = .72, p < .001) and Scaled
Verdicts (r = .75, p < .001).  As indicated earlier, dichotomous verdicts (guilty or
not guilty) and Scaled Verdicts were highly correlated.
83. Three participants failed to answer the question regarding the percentage
of evidence favoring the state, leaving us with 492 respondents instead of 495.
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For each participant, we then determined if they used what we call
“the 60/65 rule.”  A participant used the rule if they said (a) less than 60%
of the evidence favored the State and voted not guilty, or (b) more than
65% of the evidence favored the State and voted guilty.  According to these
criteria, 84% of all participants used the rule, 9% did not use the rule, and
7% could not be categorized (because they estimated that 60% or 65% of
the evidence favored the State).  Of those participants who could be cate-
gorized, 90% (411 of 456) followed the 60/65 rule.  Most importantly, the
different burden of proof instructions had no effect on whether a partici-
pant used the 60/65 rule.  This null effect can be expressed mathemati-
cally: c2(4) = 4.06, p = .40, V = .09.84
Seventy-seven percent of participants correctly answered the atten-
tion-check question about the number of witnesses who testified.85  Eighty-
four percent (247 of 293) of the participants who received a BRD instruc-
tion correctly understood that, if they had a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s guilt, they must not convict.  Only 42% (83 of 199) of the
participants who received a POE or CCE instruction correctly understood
that, if they were convinced the charge was true, they could convict the
defendant even if they had a reasonable doubt about guilt.  Put another
way, 74% of all participants reported that the standard of proof in the case
before them was BRD, even though only 60% of participants (296 out of
495) actually received a BRD instruction.86
V. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS
Our study’s two major findings—(a) different burden of proof in-
structions did not produce different verdict patterns, and (b) nearly all
jurors used a simple 60/65 rule of thumb when deciding whether to con-
vict—are discussed below.
A. Different Burdens of Proof
The first finding of our study—that different burdens of proof had no
impact on juror verdicts—is consistent with the results of studies con-
84. Additionally, we found that participants’ use of the 60/65 rule was not as-
sociated with gender, V = .06, p = .66, and was not associated with prior jury experi-
ence, V = .08, p = .43.  The statistic V is a correlation coefficient that measures the
degree to which two variables are mathematically related to each other.  Like its
statistical sibling r, values of V can range from 0 to 1.00.  The statistic V is used
when both variables are nominal (categorical) variables, e.g., a participant’s prior
jury experience (yes or no) and a participant’s use of the 60/65 rule (yes or no).
85. Our attention-check question was more difficult than the questions used
in some MTurk studies (e.g., which of the following best describes the shape of a
ball?).  Also, the wording of the question may have confused some participants.
Two participants contacted us off-line to say they were confused by the word “wit-
ness” in the question; they pointed out that “witness” could refer to a person who
testified at trial or to a person who observed the incident or evidence of it.
86. For a discussion of participants’ understanding of their burden of proof
instructions, see infra Part VII.
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ducted decades ago.  As we discussed earlier, those studies were limited by
weak external validity (i.e., generalizability) and weak statistical conclusion
validity.  However, we were able to successfully remedy those problems
with our study.
Specifically, our study participants were jury-eligible adults between
the ages of 18 and 76 who hailed from 45 states.  They responded to four
different criminal cases, each with its own fact pattern and evidence
strength.  We also used a large sample (N = 495) to produce a high-pow-
ered test.  Yet, once again, the different standards of proof—POE, CCE,
and BRD—had no discernible impact on mock jurors’ verdicts.  We ob-
served the same null effect across four criminal cases with different fact
patterns and varying evidence strength.  In short, the BRD instruction did
not offer any greater protection than the two civil burdens of proof, and
this held true regardless of the charged crime and regardless of the
strength of the State’s case.
To our knowledge, no researcher has been able to demonstrate that
the concept of BRD, particularly when left undefined or only minimally
defined, provides defendants with more protection than the civil burdens
of proof.87  To the contrary, multiple researchers have now observed that
burden of proof instructions have no effect on verdicts, regardless of the
characteristics of the participants used, the charges against the defendant,
the specific facts and strength of evidence in the case under consideration,
and the decade in which the study was conducted.
B. The 60/65 Rule
Although the mock jurors in our study were not sensitive to variations
in the burden of proof instructions, they were highly sensitive to variations
in the strength of the evidence.  When evidence against the defendant was
strong, participants generally voted to convict, regardless of the burden of
proof; when evidence against the defendant was weak, participants gener-
ally voted to acquit, regardless of the burden of proof.  Juror sensitivity to
evidence strength was observed in both cases (battery and trespassing) and
across all three burdens of proof.  A “strength of evidence” effect has also
been observed in other studies of jury decision-making.88
87. We are aware of one study where variations in the laxity or stringency of a
BRD definition affected individual and mock jury verdicts in the expected way. See
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and
Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 282, 286 (1976) (testing (1) an instruction leaving BRD undefined, (2) a
lax-criterion BRD instruction telling the jury that “[a] reasonable doubt is not just
a possible doubt, not a capricious or trivial doubt,” and (3) a stringent-criterion
BRD instruction warning the jury that, in order to convict, “the prosecution must
have convinced you to a moral certainty, with absolute and positive proof, that the
defendant is guilty”).
88. For a review, see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 622 (2001).
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Put another way, although mock jurors’ verdict choices were not in-
fluenced by their burden of proof instruction, neither did they choose
their verdicts in a haphazard, unpredictable fashion.  In fact, we found
strong evidence that jurors used a simple rule, unencumbered by legal
standards of proof, about how much evidence of guilt is needed to convict.
We call this the 60/65 rule.  Participants who used this rule—and 90% of
them in our study did—voted to acquit when they believed that less than
60% of the evidence favored the State but voted to convict when they be-
lieved that more than 65% of the evidence favored the State.
The existence of a 60/65 rule—or something very similar to it—is
substantiated by human judgment studies that have found the tipping
point from acquittal to conviction to be somewhere between 63% and
68% probability of guilt.89  Jury researcher Irwin Horowitz was apparently
correct when he wrote, more than twenty years ago, that “[r]ather than
having to move jurors from 0% to 90% certainty, all prosecutors need do
is move the needle on the scale from 50% to perhaps 65% certainty.”90
A great deal of research now demonstrates that reasonable doubt is
not self-defining.  If the BRD standard is to offer defendants greater pro-
tection than lower burdens of proof, and if it is to require more than a
mere “65% certainty” in jurors’ minds before they convict, then the con-
cept of reasonable doubt must be properly defined for the jury.
VI. HOW TO DEFINE REASONABLE DOUBT
Trial judges are responsible for ensuring that juries understand the
law.91  But when the concept of reasonable doubt is left undefined (or,
worse yet, is defined improperly), defendants are at risk of being convicted
with a level of proof that is significantly lower than what is expected by the
courts and required by the Constitution.
What can be done to prompt jurors in criminal cases to apply the
concept of reasonable doubt in a legally appropriate manner?  As a New
Hampshire court stated, “a jury must be given some assistance in under-
89. See supra Part III.
90. Irwin A. Horowitz, Reasonable Doubt Instructions: Commonsense Justice and
Standard of Proof, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 285, 294 (1997).
91. See State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560, 584 (Wis. 2013) (“A circuit court
must, however, ‘exercise its discretion in order “to fully and fairly inform the jury
of the rules of law applicable to the case and to assist the jury in making a reasona-
ble analysis of the evidence.”’”).  This is true even when jury instruction commit-
tees have issued jurisdiction-wide pattern instructions. See Drafting Committee,
Preface to, PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST
CIRCUIT (1997) (“Although . . . the pattern instructions . . . will be helpful in craft-
ing a jury charge in a particular case, it bears emphasis that no district judge is
required to use the pattern instructions. . . .”); United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas,
11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that, with regard to the mandate “to
seek the truth,” “although the sentence is taken from the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury
Instructions, trial courts, in an abundance of caution, may wish to delete it from
their instructions.”) (footnote omitted).
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standing the concept.”92  We believe this “assistance” must be substantial,
as the brief yet clear instructions used in burden of proof studies have
failed to produce legally-proper verdict patterns.
First, burden of proof jury instructions should begin, as most already
do, by explaining the presumption of innocence.  This part of the instruc-
tion should also include, as Hawaii’s does, a warning such as this: “The
presumption of innocence is not a mere slogan but an essential part of the
law that is binding upon you.”93
Second, because jurors are more likely to follow instructions when
trial judges explain the rationale behind them,94 judges should identify
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the applicable standard and also ex-
plain why it is such an important concept in criminal law: (1) it protects us
from loss of “life, liberty, and property” at the hand of the government,
and (2) nearly as important, it helps to ensure the community’s confi-
dence in the criminal justice system.95  Put another way, “It is critical that
the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being con-
demned.”96  This principle should be communicated to the jury in plain
English.
Third, with regard to the reasonable doubt definition itself, some re-
searchers have advised trial judges to instruct jurors in a way that places
the relevant burden of proof within its legal context.97  There is empirical
support for this recommendation.  For example, when study participants
received a set of instructions that included all three standards of proof—
POE, CCE, and BRD—from a single jurisdiction, they were able to com-
pare and contrast the standards.98  Based on participants’ rating of each
standard in terms of how difficult it would be for a plaintiff to win a civil
case, the researchers concluded that the different burdens of proof “might
92. State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980).
93. HAW. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3.02 (2014).  Such language is impor-
tant, as research has shown that jurors may simply be glossing over the presump-
tion of innocence.  That is, “while the law ostensibly creates a presumption of
innocence, it is widely recognized, both as a matter of theory and empirics, that
prosecutors are actually aided by a presumption of guilt, at least once the first bits
of evidence are introduced . . . .” Findley, supra note 61, at 1284 (citing Michael J.
Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings,
and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2003)).
94. See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2006).
95. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
96. Id. at 364.
97. See Stoffelmayr & Diamond, supra note 51, at 776 (“By providing this ex-
plicit contrast with a less stringent standard of proof, the definition encourages
jurors to adopt an appropriately high threshold for conviction. It could be
strengthened even further by adding an additional contrast with clear and
convincing . . . .”).
98. Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 36, at 172.
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affect verdicts as intended by the law, if they were presented in comparative
context.”99
We strongly agree with these recommendations.  Specifically, trial
judges should instruct juries on all three standards of proof and explicitly
state that POE is the lowest standard, CCE is higher, and BRD is higher
still.  In criminal cases, defining “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” by
comparing it to other, lower standards would provide the necessary con-
text for jurors to appreciate this high standard.  To illustrate, the language
below is designed to produce legally-proper verdict patterns.
Some civil cases use the preponderance of evidence standard.  In
those cases, it is only necessary to prove that something is proba-
bly true, or more likely true than not.  But this is a criminal case,
and the State’s proof must be more powerful than that.
Other civil cases use the clear and convincing evidence standard.
In those cases, it is necessary to prove that the truth of something
is highly probable.  But this is a criminal case, and the State’s
proof must also be more powerful than that.
In criminal cases such as this, you can convict the defendant only
if the State’s proof satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty.  If it does not, you must find the defen-
dant not guilty even if you think the charge is probably true, and
even if you think it is highly probable that the charge is true.100
Fourth, the instruction should conclude by conveying the Supreme
Court’s mandate that, to convict a defendant under this high burden of
proof, the jury must “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of
the accused . . . .”101  One way to convey this is to end the instruction as
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Michael D. Cicchini, Instructing Jurors on Reasonable Doubt: It’s All Relative,
8 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 72, 85 (2017).  Some jurisdictions already instruct jurors
on a comparative basis. See, e.g., MASS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 2.180 (2015)
(“It is not enough . . . to establish a probability, even a strong probability, that the
defendant is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.  That is not enough.”); ARIZ.
CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 5b(1) (2015) (“In civil cases, it is only necessary to
prove that a fact is more likely true than not or that its truth is highly probable. In
criminal cases such as this, the State’s proof must be more powerful than that.”).
Our recommended instruction draws heavily from Arizona’s instruction, but more
forcefully distinguishes the BRD standard from the two civil burdens of proof.
Conversely, other jurisdictions also instruct jurors on a comparative basis, but do
more harm than good in the process.  For example, stating that BRD is a higher
standard than “mere suspicion of guilt” says nothing of value, is grossly misleading,
and could even lower the burden of proof. See Michael D. Cicchini, Roger Federer,
Michael Cicchini, and Pennsylvania’s Burden of Proof, THE LEGAL WATCHDOG (June 17,
2017), http://thelegalwatchdog.blogspot.com/2017/06/roger-federer-michael-
cicchini-and.html [https://perma.cc/HE2A-DKL9].
101. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (emphasis added).
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North Carolina does: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that fully
satisfies or entirely convinces you of the defendant’s guilt.”102
In sum, criminal defendants in many states and federal jurisdictions
are not adequately protected from conviction because jurors do not apply
the BRD standard in the manner that judges expect and the Constitution
requires.  The reason for this state of affairs is clear: The legal concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not self-defining.  To remedy this prob-
lem, criminal courts should instruct jurors on BRD in a way that includes
four components.  First, judges should explain the presumption of inno-
cence; second, judges should identify BRD as the applicable burden of
proof and explain its importance to the jury; third, judges should present
the BRD standard within its legal context by comparing and contrasting
the three burdens of proof; and fourth, judges should conclude by
stressing the Supreme Court’s “near certitude” requirement for
conviction.
VII. STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER TESTING
All empirical studies are flawed in the sense that methodological deci-
sions designed to solve one problem often exacerbate another.  Possible
limitations of our study include the following.
First, mock jurors in our study were jury-eligible adults who re-
sponded to realistic fact patterns, but they did not participate in an actual
trial.  We chose to test the impact of different instructions in an artificial
setting because we needed a high level of experimental control.  We were
able to systematically vary instructions among participants and hold other
variables constant in a way that could never be achieved in actual trials.
Real jurors in actual trials, however, may give more attention to a burden
of proof instruction and make a greater effort to apply the standard in a
legally-proper manner.  However, this would first require that jurors under-
stand the burden of proof.  In one study, most real-life jurors who had
completed jury duty were still confused about the meaning of BRD.103
Second, the mock jurors in our study read a short trial summary; they
did not watch a lengthy videotaped reenactment of a trial.  We chose to
use abbreviated summaries for two reasons.  To begin, we wished to give
the burden of proof instruction every opportunity to have an impact on
jurors’ verdicts by minimizing the amount of additional information that
102. N.C. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 101.10 (2008).
103. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal
Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 401 (1990).  Similarly, with regard to the closely related con-
cept of the presumption of innocence, about one-third of real-life Wyoming jurors
“believed that the reasonable doubt standard does cause a shift in the burden of
proof from the government to the defendant, despite instructions by the court
explaining the presumption of innocence.”  Solan, supra note 52, at 120 (discuss-
ing Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998)).
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might wash out a standard of proof effect.  Further, mock jurors typically
do not react differently to abbreviated and more elaborate case summa-
ries.104  Nevertheless, researchers may wish to employ more realistic simu-
lations when they examine the impact of judicial instructions on verdict
patterns.
Third, the mock jurors in our study did not deliberate with others
before choosing a verdict.  It seems reasonable to believe that jurors who
deliberate will come to understand the judge’s instruction as they deliber-
ate and then apply the standard when choosing a verdict.  On the other
hand, in a study discussed earlier, the mock jurors deliberated in a group
but still returned verdicts that were not affected by the standard of proof
assigned.105  Other studies have found that deliberations play a minor
role, as actual jurors devote less than one percent of their deliberation
time to issues related to the burden of proof.106  Further, the verdict fa-
vored by a majority of jurors before deliberation almost always becomes
the jury’s final verdict.107
Fourth, MTurk workers have a financial incentive to complete tasks
quickly and may have skimmed the trial summary and judge’s instruction.
We believe this scenario is unlikely for two reasons.  First, the online par-
ticipants in our study devoted as much time to the required tasks as did
participants in our face-to-face pilot study.  Second, a large majority of the
online participants correctly answered a difficult attention-check question
and were highly sensitive to variations in the strength of evidence against
the defendant.  Participants could not have distinguished so clearly be-
tween the strong- and weak-evidence cases if they had merely skimmed the
trial summary.  Our positive experience with the participants in our study
is not surprising: “evaluations have found that MTurk participants’ atten-
tion is equal to or better than undergraduate participants’ attention.”108
Finally, although our findings align very closely with earlier findings
that jurors are not sensitive to different burdens of proof, and that jurors
will vote guilty even when evidence does not reach a quantitative threshold
consistent with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we are not able to say,
precisely, why this is so.  Put another way, did we obtain null effects be-
104. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in
the Study of Juror Behavior: A Methodological Note, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1989).
105. Cornish & Sealy, supra note 32, at 215.
106. James R. P. Ogloff, Judicial Instructions and the Jury: A Comparison of Alter-
native Strategies, FINAL REPORT (BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW FOUNDATION, 1988).
107. Shari S. Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 561, 564 (1997); Bornstein & Greene, supra note 66, at 65 (“In ap-
proximately 90% of trials, the position favored by the majority at the beginning of
deliberations becomes the jury verdict.”).
108. Buhrmester et al., supra note 68, at 151 (citation omitted).  Further, ju-
ror inattention is a common issue an issue in real-life jury trials as well. See State v.
Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the denial of
defendant’s motion for new trial despite evidence of two jurors sleeping through
evidentiary portions of the case).
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cause jurors failed to identify the proper burden of proof, i.e., POE, CCE,
BRD, before rendering a verdict?  Did they identify the proper burden but
simply not understand it?  Or did they both identify and understand the
burden of proof but simply refuse to follow it?
There is evidence that some of our participants misidentified the bur-
den of proof from the outset.  Specifically, we tested the three burdens of
proof using criminal-case fact patterns.  Previous researchers used civil-case
fact patterns because “confusion might arise if subjects were asked to apply
any standard other than reasonable doubt to a criminal case.”109  In our
study, we included a post-verdict question that can be used to evaluate this
concern.
As stated earlier, while 84% (247 of 293) of our study participants
who received a BRD instruction correctly described their instruction in a
post-verdict question, only 42% (83 of 199) of the participants who re-
ceived a POE or CCE instruction were able to do so.  That is, they de-
scribed their instruction as being BRD.  This could partly explain why
participants were not sensitive to the different standard of proof instruc-
tions: some of them failed to identify the proper standard to begin with.
Yet, when previous researchers tested the effect of three burden of
proof instructions using a civil-case fact pattern, there was certainly a risk
of the reverse happening: confusion might arise because subjects were
asked to apply a BRD standard to a mere civil matter.  Despite the inher-
ent difficulty of using either a civil or a criminal fact pattern to test three
different burdens of proof, both studies—the previous study using a civil
case and our study using criminal cases (battery and trespass)—produced
verdict patterns that failed to conform to the different standards of proof.
While some jurors in our study misidentified their burden of proof at
the outset, there is very strong evidence that many of them either misun-
derstood the concept of BRD or simply refused to apply it when reaching
their verdicts.110  More specifically (and as discussed above) we know from
responses to the post-verdict question that 74% of all participants re-
ported—some correctly, some incorrectly—that they had received a rea-
sonable doubt instruction.111  Despite nearly three-fourths identifying
109. Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 36, at 162.
110. Many studies and reviews have found that judicial instructions of all
kinds are poorly understood or simply ignored.  A comprehensive review of jury
decision-making studies published between 1945 and 1999 found that “[j]urors
often do not make decisions in the manner intended by the courts, regardless of
how they are instructed.”  Devine, supra note 88, at 699.  Judicial instructions con-
cerning the standard of proof are probably not an exception to the general rule.
See Kramer & Koenig, supra note 103.
111. This can be calculated using the numbers in the earlier paragraph.  Of
those who received a BRD instruction, 247 properly identified it.  Of those who
received one of the civil instructions, 116 (199 – 83) nonetheless identified their
instruction as BRD.  Therefore 363 (247 + 116) of 492 (293 + 199) or 73.8% identi-
fied their burden of proof as BRD.  (The total number of participants was 495, but
three failed to answer the post-verdict question about the burden of proof, leaving
492 respondents to the question.)
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BRD as their applicable standard, nearly all participants (90%) followed
the 60/65 rule.  That is, they either said (a) less than 60% of the evidence
favored the State and voted not guilty, or (b) more than 65% of the evi-
dence favored the State and voted guilty.
Therefore, regardless of whether jurors misidentified, misunderstood,
or simply refused to apply their burden of proof, the results of our study
and the earlier studies discussed in this Article provide strong evidence
that reasonable doubt is not self-defining.  Rather, it needs to be explicitly
and properly defined so that prosecutors must do more than “move the
needle on the scale . . . to [merely] 65% certainty”112 in order to win a
criminal conviction.
Given the numerous studies already demonstrating that reasonable
doubt is not self-defining, future researchers should test various BRD defi-
nitions—particularly our comparative, context-based definition discussed
earlier—to determine which definitions compel mock jurors to abandon
the 60/65 rule and instead demand more evidence of guilt before convict-
ing criminal defendants under the BRD standard of proof.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When instructing juries on reasonable doubt, many courts subscribe
to one of two philosophical camps.  On the one hand, many courts go to
great lengths to define, explain, or illustrate the concept of reasonable
doubt.113  On the other hand, many courts believe that the concept of
reasonable doubt is already self-defining; therefore, they believe, jury in-
structions should not attempt to further define or explain the concept, as
any attempts to do so may confuse the jury.114
It is true that many jury instructions explaining reasonable doubt cre-
ate confusion—or, worse yet, lower the burden of proof below the consti-
tutionally-mandated standard.115  However, the existing empirical
evidence suggests that reasonable doubt is not self-defining.  Not only do
mock jurors in controlled experiments fail to distinguish between reasona-
ble doubt and the lower, civil burdens of proof, they are also willing to
convict defendants based on a quantum of evidence that is much lower
than what many judges expect and the Constitution requires.116
In this Article, we presented our study that tested the impact of differ-
ent burdens of proof on juror decision-making.  We sought to remedy the
limitations of earlier studies and determine whether, instead of applying
the burden of proof instruction, jurors use a simple rule of thumb about
the quantum of evidence needed to find a defendant guilty.117
112. Horowitz, supra note 90, at 294.
113. See supra Part II.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra Part III.
117. See supra Part IV.C.
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Our findings confirmed those of previous studies: Mock jurors are not
sensitive to burden of proof instructions.  That is, reasonable doubt in-
structions provide defendants with no greater protection than the lower,
civil burdens of proof.118  Further, we found that instead of following their
burden of proof instruction, jurors used a simple heuristic that we call the
60/65 rule.119
Specifically, nearly all mock jurors in our study either said (a) less
than 60% of the evidence favored the State and voted not guilty, or (b)
more than 65% of the evidence favored the State and voted guilty.120  In
other words, the tipping point—the point at which jurors were as likely to
convict as to acquit—occurred somewhere between 60% and 65%.
The empirical evidence has repeatedly demonstrated that reasonable
doubt is not self-defining; instead, jurors need assistance in understanding
and appreciating the high burden of proof that the government must
meet when it attempts to deprive a person of life, liberty, and property.121
We therefore recommend that instructions on reasonable doubt be-
gin by describing the presumption of innocence.122  Then, instructions
should identify BRD as the applicable burden and explain the reasons that
our Constitution requires such a high burden of proof before the jury may
convict.123  The heart of any instruction should then define reasonable
doubt by relating the BRD standard to the lower POE and CCE stan-
dards.124  Such context will help jurors understand, on a comparative ba-
sis, the high level of proof that the government must produce.  Finally,
instructions should conclude with language that communicates the Su-
preme Court’s “subjective state of near certitude” requirement for a crimi-
nal conviction.125
118. See supra Part IV.D.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra Part V.
122. See supra Part VI.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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